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I. INTRODUCTION 
When rebels from neighboring countries crossed the border and 
fomented rebellion, the government in Nafissatou’s country responded 
with a brutal crackdown.1 Nafissatou and her husband, devout Muslims, 
decried the violence on both sides.2 After destroying their home, soldiers 
took Nafissatou and her husband into custody.3 In jail, soldiers repeated-
ly beat both of them and gang raped Nafissatou.4 After her husband died 
of his wounds, a neighbor came to Nafissatou’s aid and helped her es-
cape.5 Eventually, Nafissatou arrived in the United States and applied for 
asylum.6 
Fauziya, a seventeen-year-old girl and the youngest daughter of a 
privileged family, attended a boarding school.7 Her father advocated ed-
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate 2015. 
 1. The precise story that Nafissatou Diallo related on her asylum application and in her inter-
view is unclear. It has been compiled here from the following sources, hereinafter referred to as the 
Diallo Sources: BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: GUINEA (2003), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27731.htm; Sam Dolnick, Immigrants May Be Fed False 
Stories to Bolster Asylum Pleas, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/ 
nyregion/immigrants-may-be-fed-false-stories-to-bolster-asylum-pleas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; 
Jim Dwyer, With False Tale About Gang Rape, Strauss-Kahn Case Crumbles, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/nyregion/housekeepers-false-tale-undid-strauss-kahn-
case.html?_r=0; Jim Dwyer & Michael Wilson, Strauss-Kahn Accuser’s Call Alarmed Prosecutors, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/nyregion/one-revelation-after-
another-undercut-strauss-kahn-accusers-credibility.html?pagewanted=all; Matt Williams, Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn Settles Sexual Assault Case with Hotel Maid, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/10/dominique-strauss-kahn-case-settled. 
 2. See Diallo Sources, supra note 1. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id.  
 6. See id. 
 7. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358–59 (B.I.A. 1996); Karen Musalo, In Re: Fauziya 
Kasinga: Brief for the Respondent, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUDIES 373, 378 (1998). 
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ucation for girls and opposed both polygamous marriages and female 
genital mutilation (FGM).8 When Fauziya’s father died, however, his 
property and family reverted to the control of paternal relatives.9 
Fauziya’s paternal aunt halted her education, contracted for her to enter a 
polygamous marriage with a man thirty years her senior, and made ar-
rangements for her “circumcision”.10 Fauziya’s sister and her aunt came 
to her aid: they pooled their money, took Fauziya to the nearest airport, 
and put her on the first international flight.11 With help from kindly 
strangers, Fauziya eventually arrived in the United States and applied for 
asylum.12 
Every day, Asylum Officers (AOs) and Immigration Judges (IJs) 
hear cases like these. Their task is to determine if the asylum seeker has a 
genuine claim to protection under the Refugee Act, which prohibits re-
turning a refugee to a country where her life or freedom is threatened due 
to race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or membership in a partic-
ular social group.13 AOs and IJs are aware that their decision may mean 
life or death for an asylum seeker.14 They are also aware that false claims 
are “distressingly common,”15 that unscrupulous attorneys and unauthor-
ized practitioners of immigration law have perpetrated fraudulent asylum 
schemes,16 and that granting asylum where it is not merited encourages 
asylum fraud and weakens the immigration system.17 
                                                            
 8. Musalo, supra note 7, at 378. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 379–80. 
 11. Id. at 380–81. 
 12. Id. at 381–82. 
 13. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2009). 
 14. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
INTERVIEWING PART I: OVERVIEW OF NONADVERSARIAL ASYLUM INTERVIEW 5 (2006) [hereinafter 
AOBTC INTERVIEWING PART I], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/ 
Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Interview%20 
Part-Overview-Nonadversarial-Asylum-Interview-31aug10.pdf (“An applicant wrongly found ineli-
gible for asylum status may . . . eventually . . . face persecution or death.”). 
 15. Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 2013). See also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-08-9353, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN ACTIONS TO HELP ENSURE 
QUALITY IN THE ASYLUM ADJUDICATION PROCESS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN (2008) [hereinafter 
GAO ASYLUM REPORT] (detailing concerns of AOs and IJs regarding making accurate decisions on 
asylum claims). 
 16. See, e.g., Pavlov v. Holder, 697 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2012) (detailing evidence of a false 
application racket); Dhariwal v. Mayorkas, CV 11-2593 PSG, 2011 WL 6779314, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 27, 2011) (describing evidence that law firm had submitted over one thousand fraudulent asy-
lum applications). 
 17. Monica Schurtman & Monique C. Lillard, Remedial and Preventive Responses to the Un-
authorized Practice of Immigration Law, 20 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 60 (2014) (describing the 
systemic as well as personal harm resulting from immigration fraud). 
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The American immigration system poses challenges to both the 
asylum seeker and the decisionmakers. Immigration law has been de-
scribed as a “labyrinth,” similar in complexity to the Internal Revenue 
Code.18 Asylum seekers are often unrepresented, unfamiliar with the law, 
and nonfluent in English.19 Yet, even immigrants who are represented by 
counsel may still be at a disadvantage; according to one study, the level 
of representation in immigration is the worst of any civil field.20 In addi-
tion, asylum claims depend heavily—sometimes entirely—on the credi-
bility of the applicant. Due to the difficulty in obtaining documentary and 
testimonial evidence regarding conditions of persecution, the asylum 
seeker’s own testimony is often the only evidence.21 The consistency, 
detail, and specificity with which an asylum seeker relates her story—
particularly the most traumatic events—is of prime importance to the 
determination of whether or not asylum is granted.22 
AOs and IJs work within an overburdened system. IJs are under 
enormous pressure to hear claims quickly; in 2006, IJs were expected to 
hear 1,400 cases per year, or nearly twenty-seven per week.23 In some 
immigration courts, those already high numbers have skyrocketed. A 
2014 Washington Post investigation revealed that an IJ in Arlington had 
twenty-six cases scheduled in one morning, resulting in an average of 
seven minutes per case.24 In addition, a 2008 study by the Government 
                                                            
 18. Escobar-Grijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Castro-O'Ryan v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Immigration and Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 19. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 STATISTICAL 
YEAR BOOK, at G1 (2013) [hereinafter EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf (reporting that 56% of respondents were represent-
ed in removal cases in FY 2012). 
 20. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal Represen-
tation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331 (2011) (reporting that fifty-seven percent of federal appellate 
judges find immigration the field of law in which they perceive the most significant disparities in 
legal representation). An indicator of the extent of the problem is the online list of immigration prac-
titioners currently under discipline for professional misconduct. Exec. Office for Immigration Re-
view, List of Currently Disciplined Practitioners, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/discipline.htm. 
 21. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2013) (stating that the applicant’s testimony alone 
may be sufficient to establish eligibility for asylum); Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“[I]t must be acknowledged that a genuine refugee does not flee her native country armed 
with affidavits, expert witnesses, and extensive documentation.”). 
 22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2009). See also Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 
(9th Cir. 2010) (explaining the standards for credibility determinations). 
 23. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 295, 383 (2007) (quoting Second Circuit Chief Judge John M. Walker. Walker continued, “I 
fail to see how Immigration Judges can be expected to make thorough and competent findings of fact 
and conclusions of law under these circumstances.”). 
 24. Eli Saslow, In a Crowded Immigration Court, Seven Minutes to Decide a Family’s Future, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-a-crowded-immigration-
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Accountability Office found that 82% of IJs and 65% of AOs believe 
they have insufficient time to thoroughly adjudicate cases.25 The pressure 
to hear ever more cases also leads to a lack of training and professional 
development: a majority of AOs and IJs cited a need for increased ongo-
ing training, especially in assessing credibility and detecting fraud.26 Sig-
nificant inconsistencies in the grant rates between and within asylum of-
fices and immigration courts are a further indication of the burdens on 
the system.27 In the cases of Nafissatou and Fauziya, one woman was 
telling the truth, and one woman was lying.28 The fraudulent claim suc-
ceeded while the genuine claim was denied.29 
The cry for immigration reform is growing stronger. Many pro-
posals advocate substantive reforms to asylum law, including broadening 
asylum protections and streamlining asylum procedures;30 granting rights 
of discovery in immigration court;31 and establishing an inquisitorial, 
rather than an adversarial, system for asylum proceedings.32 Substantive 
reforms, however, require congressional action and are mired in political 
debate.33 This Note proposes a procedural reform to the affirmative asy-
lum process: the direct and proactive disclosure of routine documents in 
the applicant’s file, bypassing the need for a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request.34 This reform is politically feasible because it is within 
                                                                                                                                     
court-seven-minutes-to-decide-a-familys-future/2014/02/02/518c3e3e-8798-11e3-a5bd-
844629433ba3_story.html?hpid=z4. 
 25. GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 15, at 58, 70. 
 26. Id. at 5, 22. 
 27. Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively Denied: The Detrimental Effects of a Reduced Grant Rate 
for Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 61, 79–81 (2009) (discussing inconsistent grant 
rates among and between asylum offices and recommending increased training and decreased work-
load for AOs). See also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 23, at 378 (analyzing the inconsistency in 
grant rates and concluding that “[w]hether an asylum applicant is able to live safely in the United 
States or is deported to a country in which he claims to fear persecution is very seriously influenced 
by a spin of the wheel of chance; that is, by a clerk’s random assignment of an applicant’s case to 
one asylum officer rather than another, or one immigration judge rather than another.”). 
 28. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 364 (B.I.A. 1996); Dwyer, supra note 1. 
 29. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 364; Dwyer, supra note 1. 
 30. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 
113th Cong. (2013). 
 31. See Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way Mirror Discovery in Immigration Court, 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (2014). 
 32. See Won Kidane, The Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal Proceedings, 45 AKRON L. REV. 
647, 647 (2012). 
 33. See, e.g., Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, After Deriding G.O.P. on Immigration Bill, 
Boehner Shifts His Aim to Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/us/politics/immigration-bill-hinges-on-new-obama-attitude-
boehner-says.html. 
 34. For a discussion of the challenges of using FOIA to obtain immigration records, see Larry 
R. Fleurantin, Immigration Law: Nowhere to Turn—Illegal Aliens Cannot Use the Freedom of In-
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agency discretion and requires no legislative action.35 While proactive 
disclosure in affirmative asylum adjudications is not a substitute for 
comprehensive immigration reform, it is a pragmatic step that would im-
prove efficiency, lower administrative costs, increase confidence in the 
immigration system, and lead to fairer and more accurate determinations 
of credibility. 
Part II begins with an overview of asylum law, including its history, 
the extent of the refugee population, eligibility requirements, and the ap-
plication process. Part III describes the procedure for those asylum seek-
ers whose claims are referred to immigration courts, while Part IV de-
scribes the inefficient and burdensome process for obtaining immigration 
records. Part V proposes that documents concerning the asylum seeker’s 
application be proactively disclosed at the time the applicant is referred 
to an immigration court and describes two prerequisites to implementa-
tion: a shift in approach on the part of the referring agency and an expan-
sion of AO authority so that the AO makes preliminary decisions about 
disclosure. Part VI concludes with a summary of the need for procedural 
changes and the benefits of adopting procedures that facilitate a freer 
exchange of information. 
II. ASYLUM LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
A. International Roots of American Asylum Law 
American asylum law is based on international agreements that 
were assembled following World War I and were expanded and solidi-
fied following World War II.36 In response to the hundreds of thousands 
of war refugees who had not yet been permanently resettled years after 
                                                                                                                                     
formation Act as a Discovery Tool to Fight Unfair Removal Hearings, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 155, 155 (2008). 
 35. Proactive disclosure is not only within agency discretion, it is in accord with policy guide-
lines from the current Administration and from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Attor-
ney General Holder’s Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning 
the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 51879 (Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Holder Memo], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2009/06/24/foia-memo-march2009 
.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2013 CHIEF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OFFICER REPORT TO 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2013) [hereinafter DHS 2013 CHIEF FOIA OFFICER REPORT], available 
at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/Reports/Final%20DHS%202013-
chief-foia-officer-report-final_0.pdf. 
 36. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO 
THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1 (2011) [hereinafter UNHCR 1951 
CONVENTION], available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html. See also DEBORAH E. ANKER, 
LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 1999) (discussing that asylum status, 
withholding of removal, and refugee status are all based on provisions from the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol ratified by the United States in 1968). 
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the close of World War II, the international community (through the 
United Nations) ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees in 1951 (1951 Convention) and later, the 1967 Protocol.37 
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol remain the founda-
tional documents in international asylum law and serve as the basis for 
American asylum law.38 They codify the belief that nation-states have a 
responsibility to protect fundamental human rights: if an alien has a 
“well-founded fear of being persecuted” in her home country, the Con-
vention and Protocol prohibit returning her to that country.39 The Con-
vention and Protocol define “refugee,” specify the legal protection and 
social rights a refugee is entitled to receive, and outline the obligations of 
a refugee towards a host country.40 The United States fully recognized 
the refugee rights established by the international community with the 
Refugee Act of 1980.41 
B. The Global and Domestic Refugee Population 
While the UN Convention and U.S. asylum law establish the right 
of individuals to seek asylum, they do not oblige nation-states to accept 
refugees for resettlement.42 Because there are many more refugees than 
host countries are willing to accept, refugees often spend years in limbo, 
unable to return home but without permanent legal status in another 
country.43 Of the 10.4 million refugees worldwide, nearly 7.1 million 
have been living in temporary exile for five years or more.44 In 2012, less 
                                                            
 37. UNHCR 1951 CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 1. 
 38. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History 
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 9 (1981); DANIEL C. MARTIN & JAMES E. 
YANKAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2012 
2 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2012.pdf [here-
inafter DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT]. 
 39. UNHCR 1951 CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 3. 
 40. Id. at 4–5. 
 41. Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 141, 145 (1981). 
 42. DIV. OF INT’L PROT., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR 
RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 5 (2011) [hereinafter UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK], available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf. 
 43. Id. at 17. 
 44. The figure of 10.4 million includes only those refugees who remain in temporary living 
conditions; it does not include refugees who have been granted permanent residence in another coun-
try or have been repatriated. The figure also excludes the 4.8 million Palestinians registered as refu-
gees and living in 60 camps in the Middle East. UNHCR GLOBAL REPORT 2012, FINDING DURABLE 
SOLUTIONS 3 (2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d61d0.html. For a more detailed de-
scription of refugee and IDP numbers, see UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 5. 
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than 1% of the world’s refugees were granted resettlement in a host 
country.45 
Domestically, refugees (immigrants who enter the United States 
with legal status as refugees) and asylum seekers (immigrants who seek 
refugee status after entering the United States) make up a small percent-
age of immigrants to the United States.46 In 2011, the United States 
granted residency to 31,396 refugees, less than 3% of the total legal im-
migrants for that year.47 That same year, approximately 48,000 people 
applied for asylum and about half of that number were successful in their 
request;48 asylees (asylum seekers who have been granted refugee status) 
thus represented about 2% of legal immigrants in 2011.49 However, the 
stakes are high for this small number of asylum seekers. People without 
legal status who have a legitimate fear of returning to their home country 
are particularly vulnerable to exploitation, trafficking, and sexual or gen-
der-based violence.50 In order to gain legal status and a measure of secu-
rity, these asylum seekers must demonstrate that they meet several condi-
tions of eligibility. 
C. Conditions of Eligibility 
Asylum is a discretionary grant of lawful permanent residency that 
may be granted upon a showing that the applicant meets the definition of 
a refugee and does not face any statutory bars.51 A refugee located out-
side of the United States applies for refugee status through the Refugee 
Admissions Program.52 A refugee within the United States, called an 
“asylum seeker,” applies for refugee status either affirmatively through 
                                                            
 45. UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 17. 
 46. A refugee applies for and is granted residency from outside the United States; an asylum 
seeker is already present in the United States when she applies for residency. DEP’T OF STATE, 
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES FACTSHEET (2013) [hereinafter RESETTLEMENT 
FACTSHEET], available at http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2013/203578.htm. See also 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1521, 1522 (2014). 
 47. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2011 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 48 (2011) [hereinafter DHS 2011 IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK], available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2011/ois_yb_ 
2011.pdf (figure based on 1,062,040 new lawful permanent residents). 
 48. EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK, supra note 19, at K1. 
 49. DHS 2011 IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at 11, 48. 
 50. See, e.g., UNHCR GLOBAL APPEAL 2012–2013, http://www.unhcr.org/ga12/index.xml (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2015) (discussing the need to protect refugees from gender-based violence, human 
trafficking, discrimination and xenophobia); UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 
3, 6 (stating that 48% of refugees are female, 46% are under 18 years of age, and a small but grow-
ing number are unaccompanied minors). 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2009). 
 52. RESETTLEMENT FACTSHEET, supra note 46. See also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521, 1522 (2014). 
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United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or defen-
sively in immigration court.53 Whatever the route, persons seeking refu-
gee status have the burden of establishing that they meet a three-part 
standard. 
First, the person must be outside his or her country of nationality or 
habitual residence.54 Many local conflicts cause enormous upheaval of 
populations within a country’s own borders. In 2013, for example, the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 
over two million Syrians fled their homes in search of safer areas within 
Syria.55 Those displaced from one area of a country to another are known 
as “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPs); IDPs are eligible for various 
types of international aid, but are not eligible for refugee status.56 
Second, the person must have “a well-founded fear of persecution” 
on account of a protected status: race, religion, nationality, political opin-
ion, or membership in a particular social group.57 This second element 
distinguishes refugees from migrants.58 A migrant may have pressing 
reasons to relocate, such as a lack of economic or educational opportuni-
ties in her home country, widespread crime, a desire to reunite with fami-
ly, or the need to escape the aftermath of a natural disaster. In contrast, a 
refugee has fled her country because of targeted persecution directed to-
wards her because of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
social group. 
Third, the home country must be unable or unwilling to protect the 
person from the persecution she fears.59 Again, this element serves to 
distinguish refugees from migrants. A migrant continues to enjoy the 
protection of his or her own government, even while abroad; a refugee 
has a “well-founded fear” that the government of her home country will 
not or cannot offer protection from the targeted persecution.60 
A person who meets the three-part definition may nevertheless be 
barred from refugee status. The “persecutor bar” prohibits granting asy-
lum to refugees who formerly persecuted others.61 Various criminal con-
                                                            
 53. RESETTLEMENT FACTSHEET, supra note 46. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.2(b) (2009). 
 54. See 8 U.S.C § 101(a)(42)(A) (2013). 
 55. UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 5. 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42) (2013); UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 5. 
 57. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42)(A) (2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2009). 
 58. UNHCR 1951 CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 3. 
 59. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42)(A) (2013). 
 60. UNHCR 1951 CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 3. 
 61. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(1) (2009). The “persecutor bar” is also part of international law. 
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victions also render a person ineligible for asylum.62 Applicants who 
have been granted resettlement in one host country may not use refugee 
status to receive resettlement in another host country.63 In addition, asy-
lum applicants located in the United States must apply within one year of 
arriving.64 
D. The Application Process 
Asylum claims in the United States fall into two categories: defen-
sive and affirmative.65 Applicants who are in removal proceedings may 
assert asylum as a defense against removal, while applicants who are not 
in removal proceedings may assert an affirmative asylum claim.66 
1. Defensive Asylum Claims 
Any person who entered the United States without permission, 
overstayed legal permission to reside in the United States, or whose legal 
permission to reside in the United States was revoked due to a criminal 
conviction is subject to removal.67 Removal proceedings are initiated 
when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—the law enforce-
ment division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—issues a 
Notice to Appear in immigration court.68 A defensive asylum application 
is an avenue to request relief: the applicant argues that she should not be 
removed to her home country because she meets the definition of a refu-
gee.69 The proceeding is an adversarial hearing before an IJ.70 An ICE 
trial attorney represents the government interest and the applicant either 
represents herself or obtains counsel at no expense to the government.71 
                                                                                                                                     
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 24 (1992), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html. 
 62. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2009). 
 63. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2009). 
 64. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2009). 
 65. DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 38, at 4. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008). USCIS maintains an excellent expla-
nation of the asylum process on its website, available at http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees 
-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states. 
 68. 8 C.F.R § 1239.1(a) (2004). 
 69. Fauziya, referenced in the Introduction, filed a defensive asylum claim. See In re Kasinga, 
21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996). It is unclear whether Nafissatou, also referenced in the In-
troduction, filed a defensive or an affirmative claim. See Dwyer, supra note 1. 
 70. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2006). In the case of expedited removal, the applicant is first screened 
by an AO for “credible fear.” If the applicant is determined to have credible fear of persecution in 
her home country, she is referred to an IJ for a hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(a) (2011). 
 71. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16 (2008). The majority of defensive asylum claims are filed by immi-
grants awaiting removal in immigration detention centers. While the overall rate of representation in 
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In 2012, 35% of defensive asylum claims were granted, allowing 11,978 
persons to successfully defend their removal.72 
2. Affirmative Asylum Claims 
In 2012, USCIS granted 72% of affirmative asylum applications, 
recognizing 17,506 applicants as asylees.73 Applicants who are physical-
ly present in the United States and are not in removal proceedings may 
assert an affirmative asylum claim.74 Affirmative asylum applicants in-
clude persons in the United States with temporary legal status—usually 
persons with a visitor, student, or work visa—who fear returning to their 
home country when their visa expires, as well as persons who are in vio-
lation of status but have not yet come to the attention of ICE.75 As men-
tioned before, affirmative applications are filed with another division of 
DHS, the Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). 
The requirements are largely the same in the defensive and affirma-
tive asylum application processes. In both cases, the applicant must show 
that she meets the definition of a refugee, that she is credible, and that 
she is not barred from obtaining asylum.76 However, defensive and af-
firmative claims are adjudicated by different government agencies.77 De-
fensive claims are heard directly by a branch of the Department of Jus-
tice (the Executive Office for Immigration Review, or EOIR), with the 
ICE attorney representing DHS opposing the claim.78 In contrast, affirm-
ative claims are heard first by the Asylum Division of USCIS, a branch 
                                                                                                                                     
immigration court is 56%, the rate for detainees is much lower; by some estimates, 80% of detained 
immigrants represent themselves. See Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained 
Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 541, 575 (2009) (citing NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY 
AND PROMOTING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL ORIENTATION 
PROGRAM 1 (2008), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_ 
Evaluation_May2008_final.pdf). 
 72. DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 38, at 5. See also EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK, supra 
note 19, at A1. 
 73. DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 38, at 5. See also EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK, supra 
note 19, at A1. 
 74. DHS ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 38, at 5.  
 75. For an excellent explanation of the asylum process, including a chart of who is eligible to 
apply affirmatively, see Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-
states (last updated Mar. 10, 2011). 
 76. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2009). 
 77. See, e.g., Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-
states (last updated Mar. 10, 2011). 
 78. Id. 
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of DHS.79 When an affirmative asylum claim is filed, it is USCIS that 
accesses information about the applicant, conducts an interview, and 
makes a first decision. 
(a). The Reasonable Fear Interview 
As a branch of DHS, USCIS has broad power to locate information 
that may concern the applicant. When USCIS receives an asylum appli-
cation, the agency’s first step is to add the application to the applicant’s 
“Alien file,” commonly referred to as an “A-file.”80 In Gonzales & Gon-
zales Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc. v. United States Department of 
Homeland Security, DHS provided a nonexclusive list of the documents 
that may be contained in an A-file such as naturalization certificates; 
birth and marriage certificates; reports of arrests and investigations; 
family history; travel history; education history; employment history; 
criminal history; professional accreditation information; government-
issued identification information (i.e., passport, driver’s license); arri-
val/departure information (record number, expiration date, class of ad-
mission, etc.); FBI Identification Number; and Fingerprint Identification 
Number.81 
The application is assigned to an AO, who reviews the application 
and other documents in the A-file in preparation for an interview with the 
applicant.82 The AO has broad discretion in conducting the interview.83 
The AO is instructed “to elicit all relevant and useful information bearing 
on the applicant’s eligibility for asylum” in order to determine if the ap-
plicant is credible, if she meets the definition of a refugee, and if she has 
any bars to asylum.84 The applicant is not required to present witnesses 
or documentary evidence, but may do so if she wishes.85 
                                                            
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Privacy Act; Alien File (A-File) and Central Index System (CIS) Systems of 
Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 1755–02, 1757 (2007) (“The hardcopy paper A-File . . . contains all the indi-
vidual’s official record material such as: naturalization certificates; . . . applications and petitions for 
benefits under the immigration and nationality laws; reports of investigations; . . . correspondence; 
and memoranda on each individual for whom DHS has created a record.”). 
 81. Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds & Ins. Agency Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 913 F. 
Supp. 2d 865, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 82. AOBTC INTERVIEWING PART I, supra note 14, at 11–12. 
 83. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2011). See also ASYLUM DIVISION, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES MANUAL (2013) [hereinafter 
AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/native 
documents/Asylum_Procedures_Manual_2013.pdf. 
 84. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2011). 
 85. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(c), (e) (2011). 
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The AO takes “clearly written and comprehensive notes,” which 
serve as the only record of the interview.86 In most cases, the applicant 
does not see or review the notes.87 Under USCIS guidelines, interview 
notes should indicate “that the asylum officer pursued all relevant lines 
of questioning” and should include information bearing on credibility 
and eligibility.88 AO notes should provide an “accurate and objective 
record of the interview.”89 The AO should exercise care even in punctua-
tion because “even an exclamation point placed in reaction to a portion 
of the applicant’s testimony may appear as a judgment on the applicant’s 
claim.”90 
Following the interview, the AO performs her own research.91  She 
may consult with foreign embassies and verify the genuineness of any 
documentary evidence submitted.92 She may rely upon material from the 
Department of State “or other credible sources, such as international 
organizations, private voluntary agencies, news organizations, or aca-
demic institutions.”93 The AO also considers indicia of credibility such 
as the internal consistency of the applicant’s story and the consistency of 
the applicant’s story with external evidence.94 
(b). Decisions of the Asylum Officer 
If the AO grants asylum, the applicant has succeeded and the case 
is at an end. If the AO does not grant asylum, the procedure differs based 
on the status of the applicant.95 If the applicant has legal status in the 
United States—an applicant with a current student visa, for example—
                                                            
 86. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES, INTERVIEWING PART 2: NOTE-TAKING 3 (2006) [hereinafter AOBTC INTERVIEWING 
PART 2], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20% 
26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Interview-Part-2-Notetaking-31aug10.pdf. 
See also AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21. 
 87. If the applicant reveals information that leads the AO to believe that she may face a statuto-
ry bar to asylum, the AO switches from standard note-taking format to sworn question and answer 
format. In that case, the applicant reviews and signs the question and answer notes. AOBTC 
INTERVIEWING PART 2, supra note 86, at 6. 
 88. Id. at 5. 
 89. Id. at 5–6. 
 90. Id. at 6. 
 91. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21–22. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2011). 
 94. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES, ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY PART IV: BURDEN OF PROOF, STANDARDS OF PROOF, AND 
EVIDENCE 19 (2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/ 
Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Burden-of-Proof-Standards-
Proof-Evidence-31aug01.pdf. See also AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21−22. 
 95. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) (2011). 
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the AO issues to the applicant a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID).96 The 
NOID explains in detail the grounds on which the AO intends to deny 
the application.97 The applicant has sixteen days to respond to the NOID; 
she may submit her own written explanation of any inconsistencies or 
discrepancies noted by the AO, affidavits from experts or people familiar 
with her claim, or other documentary evidence.98 For example, if the 
NOID states that country reports do not corroborate the applicant’s story, 
the applicant may submit affidavits by experts regarding current country 
conditions.99 
In contrast, if the applicant does not have legal status, the AO pre-
pares a detailed Assessment to Refer, which contains the same basic in-
formation as a NOID.100 The AO does not, however, issue the Assess-
ment to the applicant.101 The AO adds the Assessment to Refer to the A-
file, and the entire file is transferred to the ICE office and ICE attorney 
who will oppose the asylum claim in immigration court.102 The applicant 
receives only a Notice to Appear in immigration court.103 The Notice to 
Appear—also called a Referral Notice—informs the applicant that she 
must appear at a hearing, and that if her claim is rejected, a removal or-
der will be issued.104 While regulations require that a referral to immigra-
tion court “state the basis for . . . referral [of the application] and include 
an assessment of the applicant’s credibility[,]”105 in practice, the referral 
gives only the most general idea of the basis for the AO’s decision.106 
One typical referral stated: “Your testimony at the asylum interview was 
not credible on material points of your claim.”107 
                                                            
 96. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 24. See also ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC 
TRAINING COURSE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, DECISION WRITING PART 1: 
OVERVIEW AND COMPONENTS, FOCUSING OF 1ST THREE COMPONENTS 7–10 (2006) [hereinafter 
AOBTC WRITING PART 1], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitar 
ian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Decision-Writing-Part-1-
Overview-Components-31aug10.pdf. 
 97. AOBTC WRITING PART 1, supra note 96, at 7–10. 
 98. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 34–35. 
 99. See, e.g., Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that outdated country 
reports may be insufficient to establish current country conditions). 
 100. AOBTC WRITING PART 1, supra note 96, at 12. 
 101. Id. 
 102. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 28−29. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. See also AOBTC WRITING PART 1, supra note 96, at 11. 
 105. 8 C.F.R. § 208.19 (2009). 
 106. See, e.g., Kaur v. INS, 237 F.3d 1098, 1099, opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 249 
F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 107. Id. 
1082 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1069 
The out-of-status applicant is thus referred to immigration court 
with very little idea of why her claim was not granted and with no idea of 
what evidence the AO relied upon in reaching the decision. The resulting 
imbalance of information creates a burden for the applicant, the agency, 
and the court. 
III. THE ASYLUM SEEKER REFERRED TO IMMIGRATION COURT 
The hearing before the IJ is adversarial and appears at first glance 
much like a hearing in civil or criminal court: the applicant presents her 
claim for asylum while DHS, represented by an ICE trial attorney, op-
poses her claim.108 Upon closer examination, however, the hearing in 
immigration court is unique in several respects. 
A. The Nature of an Asylum Hearing at an Immigration Court 
Unlike the criminal court system, immigration courts do not offer 
the presumption of innocence109 or right to counsel,110 and the asylum 
seeker has the burden of proving that she is eligible for relief from re-
moval and that she merits a discretionary grant of asylum.111 Immigration 
courts are not bound by the rules of evidence and the IJ has broad discre-
tion to admit into the record any evidence that she finds relevant and not 
fundamentally unfair.112 Unlike the civil court system, immigration 
courts have no meaningful right of discovery.113 To access the Assess-
ment to Refer or any of the other records in the A-file, the applicant must 
file a FOIA request seeking documents from the very agency that is 
prosecuting her; even then, documents are frequently withheld.114 
                                                            
 108. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006). 
 109. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 110. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16(b) (1997). 
 111. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 112. See In re Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 784 (B.I.A. 1999); see also Matter of Toro, 
17 I. & N. Dec. 340 (B.I.A. 1980). Hearsay, for example, is frequently admitted. See, e.g., Rojas-
Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2003); Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 729 
(7th Cir. 2001); Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 113. Heeren, supra note 31, at 1580–84 (limited discovery provisions have been applied so 
narrowly and so infrequently that they do not provide equal access to information). For instances of 
narrow discovery interpretation in immigration proceedings, see In re Mohammad J.A. Khalifah, 21 
I. & N. Dec. 107, 112 (B.I.A. 1995) (finding no prejudice in the IJ’s denial of the respondent’s mo-
tion to subpoena a witness and for production of documents in possession of other government agen-
cies); Matter of Duran, 20 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 1989) (finding that the IJ properly denied the 
respondent’s motion to subpoena government records); Matter of Escobar, 16 I. & N. Dec. 52, 53 
(B.I.A. 1976) (affirming denial of a motion for discovery). 
 114. See, e.g., Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115–
17 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (detailing documents withheld despite FOIA requests). See also Heeran, supra 
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The judge’s role is unique in immigration court. In addition to 
weighing the parties’ competing arguments, the IJ has “an affirmative 
duty to develop the record.”115 Especially when an immigrant is unrepre-
sented, the IJ must explain proceedings, elicit testimony, and consider all 
avenues of relief for which an applicant may be eligible, even if the ap-
plicant does not raise them.116 As the Ninth Circuit explained in Dent v. 
Holder: 
Because aliens appearing pro se often lack the legal knowledge to 
navigate their way successfully through the morass of immigration 
law, and because their failure to do so successfully might result in 
their expulsion from this country, it is critical that the IJ “scrupu-
lously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all 
the relevant facts.”117 
Failure to adequately explain proceedings to a pro se respondent, or fail-
ure to elicit testimony that could benefit the respondent, may be grounds 
for remand.118 The IJ must meet this double burden—both eliciting facts 
and deciding between competing claims—while under pressure to hear 
cases quickly in courts that are “severely understaffed.”119 
B. The Credibility Determination 
The credibility determination presents obstacles that favor the 
fraudulent applicant over the genuine asylum seeker, and these obstacles 
are heightened by the government withholding documents to use as im-
peachment evidence. The applicant’s primary means of meeting her bur-
den of proof is through her own testimony.120 The applicant has the right 
to call witnesses and to offer documentary evidence to support her claim 
or rebut arguments against her.121 Often, however, the applicant does not 
have such supporting evidence because “a genuine refugee does not flee 
                                                                                                                                     
note 31, at 1589–94 (detailing the challenges of obtaining documents in the A-file via FOIA re-
quest). 
 115. Constanza-Martinez v. Holder, 739 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 116. See, e.g., Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding the case because 
the applicant did not fully understand her rights at the proceeding and because the IJ did not elicit all 
relevant testimony). 
 117. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373–74 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 
871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 118. See, e.g., id. (vacating the B.I.A. decision and transferring to District Court); Jacinto, 208 
F.3d at 727. 
 119. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 23, at 383. 
 120. See, e.g., Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (“An alien must show 
by credible, direct, and specific evidence an objectively reasonable basis for the claimed fear of 
persecution.”). 
 121. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(b)(4)(B) (2006). 
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her native country armed with affidavits, expert witnesses, and extensive 
documentation.”122  
The applicant may establish refugee status through her testimony 
alone if that testimony is credible, persuasive, detailed, and specific.123 In 
determining the applicant’s credibility, the court may consider, among 
other things, the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the 
“plausibility” of her account, and the consistency among all of the appli-
cant’s oral or written statements “whenever made and whether or not 
under oath.”124 Any inconsistency in the applicant’s story may suffice to 
find her not credible.125 
To succeed, an applicant must be found credible. It is not easy, 
however, to distinguish truth from lies.126 The factors IJs rely upon, espe-
cially demeanor and consistency, tend to work against the genuine appli-
cant, specifically in the context of responding to impeachment through 
undisclosed documents. 
1. Demeanor 
To prevail on an asylum claim, not only must the applicant’s testi-
mony be consistent, detailed, and believable, but her demeanor must also 
appear appropriate to the events she relates.127 Applicants have been 
found not credible based on “hesitant and unresponsive” answers,128 “an-
swers [that are] very short, very tight, and without a natural flow,”129 
“evasive demeanor,”130 or simply based on “demeanor” without further 
                                                            
 122. Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 123. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 124. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 125. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a single 
inconsistency that goes to the heart of the claim may be grounds for finding the applicant not credi-
ble); see also Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting the REAL ID Act and 
explaining that the IJ may rely on any inaccuracy, regardless of whether it goes to the heart of the 
asylum claim, as a basis for an adverse credibility finding), amended and superseded, 544 F.3d 1029 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 126. See, e.g., James P. Eyster, Searching for the Key in the Wrong Place: Why “Common 
Sense” Credibility Rules Consistently Harm Refugees, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 7 (2012) (describing the 
fallibility of credibility determinations and noting that experts have about a 50% chance of detecting 
intentional lies); GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 15 (stating that a majority of AOs and IJs ex-
pressed the need for further training, especially in credibility determinations). 
 127. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006); see also Matter of Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 124 
(B.I.A. 1989). 
 128. Zhi Kai Tian v. Holder, 471 F. App’x 42, 43 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 129. Jian Jiang v. Holder, 327 F. App’x 275, 276 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 130. Daci v. INS, 303 F. App’x 956, 957 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Da Lin Zheng v. Holder, 332 
F. App’x 709, 710 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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explanation.131 However, cultural norms and past trauma may impede the 
applicant’s ability to testify in a manner that appears direct, specific, and 
emotionally appropriate. 
Demeanor that is appropriate in another culture may not conform to 
the American preference for directness and forthrightness.132 Asylum 
seekers from oppressive regimes may have learned to distrust govern-
ment officials and may be hesitant or frightened when speaking to au-
thorities.133 Women in particular may have been taught not to make eye 
contact and not to reveal private details to strangers.134 These experiences 
and cultural norms may cause an applicant to look down, appear nervous 
and distrustful, sweat excessively, and hesitate during her hearing—all 
things that could lead an IJ to believe, based on her demeanor, that she is 
not telling the truth.135  
Facial expressions are likewise prone to misinterpretation. For ex-
ample, as one factor in an adverse credibility finding, the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (B.I.A.) noted that the applicant “smiled” when re-
vealing a past sexual assault at her hearing, an incident she had not pre-
viously mentioned.136 The record revealed, however, that the applicant 
smiled and revealed the assault at her hearing because the IJ was a wom-
an; she had not mentioned the incident before because her previous in-
terviewers were men.137 
Past trauma may also impede the applicant’s ability to testify in a 
manner that appears direct, specific, and emotionally appropriate. Ac-
cording to UNHCR, while 1% of the general population suffers from 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), clinical studies of different ref-
ugee populations have revealed rates of PTSD ranging from 39%–
100%.138 People who suffer from PTSD may struggle to recall and relate 
traumatic events in detail.139 They may appear withdrawn, uninterested, 
                                                            
 131. Ze Feng Zhu v. Holder, 418 F. App’x 11, 13 (2d Cir. 2011); Juntian Zha v. Holder, 439 F. 
App’x 628, 629 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 132. Settlage, supra note 27, at 94. See also Katherine E. Melloy, Telling Truths: How the 
REAL ID Act’s Credibility Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 657–61 
(2007). 
 133. Melloy, supra note 132, at 657. 
 134. Id; see also Settlage, supra note 27, at 94. 
 135. Melloy, supra note 132, at 657–58. See also Settlage, supra note 27, at 94. 
 136. Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 137. Id.   
 138. DEP’T OF INT’L PROT., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK TO GUIDE RECEPTION AND INTEGRATION 233 
(2002) [hereinafter UNHCR RESETTLEMENT GUIDE], available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 
405189284.html. 
 139. Id.; see also Eyster, supra note 126, at 40 (explaining that “individuals who have suffered 
trauma have much less ability to accurately encode, store, and retrieve memories.”). 
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and unresponsive.140 Symptoms may be particularly acute when dealing 
with public officials.141 
Ironically, the fraudulent applicant is better situated to relate a de-
tailed story with appropriate demeanor than the genuine applicant. The 
applicant with a false claim typically buys a story or pays an unscrupu-
lous agent to invent a convincing story.142 For example, Nafissatou, men-
tioned in the Introduction, obtained a cassette tape with a convincing asy-
lum claim.143 She listened to the tape until she memorized the story and 
could deliver it with convincing emotion.144 Unencumbered by real, con-
fusing, and painful memories, she was found credible.145 
2. Impeaching Through Undisclosed Documents 
Each factor that disadvantages the genuine applicant in her direct 
testimony works against her even more when ICE seeks to impeach 
through undisclosed and unverified documents.146 The ICE attorney as-
signed to oppose the asylum claim has access to every document in the 
A-file and may introduce them without prior disclosure.147 Notes from 
the AO interview and the AO’s Assessment to Refer are often used to 
impeach the applicant. In Martins v. United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services, the court noted that “in many cases, ICE Trial Attor-
neys . . . compare court testimony or prior written statements to the notes 
                                                            
 140. Melloy, supra note 132, at 653. Melloy states that “[l]ack of emotion can be much more 
detrimental to a woman’s credibility than it is to a man’s, due to cultural standards of engendered 
emotion.” Id. at 654. 
 141. UNHCR RESETTLEMENT GUIDE, supra note 138, at 235. 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Liu, 239 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2000) (unscrupulous immigra-
tion agency used three general asylum stories from which applicants chose one); Pavlov v. Holder, 
697 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2012) (detailing evidence of a false application racket); Kirk Semple et 
al., Asylum Fraud in Chinatown: An Industry of Lies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/nyregion/asylum-fraud-in-chinatown-industry-of-
lies.html?_r=0. 
 143. Dwyer & Wilson, supra note 1; see also Liu, 239 F.3d at 142 (unscrupulous immigration 
agency used three general asylum stories and chose one for each applicant); Semple et al., supra note 
142. 
 144. Dwyer & Wilson, supra note 1. 
 145. Id.; see also Semple et al., supra note 141 (detailing use of memorized stories in asylum 
applications). 
 146. See, e.g., Sharma v. Holder, 457 Fed. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2011), amended on 
denial for reh’g, 249 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2011); Koulibaly v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 613, 618 (6th Cir. 
2008); Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1112–13 (N.D. Cal. 
2013). 
 147. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2013) (The IJ “may receive in evidence any oral or written state-
ment that is material and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the respondent or any 
other person during any investigation, examination, hearing, or trial.”). See also Martins, 962 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1112–13 (explaining the use of undisclosed documents to impeach). 
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[from the AO interview] in an effort to identify inconsistencies, 
and . . . try to impeach the applicant’s credibility.”148 The fraudulent ap-
plicant is more likely to survive impeachment than the genuine applicant 
for two reasons: first, by telling a consistent, rehearsed story, the fraudu-
lent applicant leaves herself less open to charges of inconsistency; and 
second, the same factors that can make a genuine applicant appear eva-
sive during her direct testimony—cultural norms, PTSD, and negative 
experiences with officials—can make it even more difficult for her to 
respond to a surprise attack on her truthfulness. 
The ICE attorney may use the AO’s interview notes or Assessment 
to Refer and argue that the applicant’s testimony is not consistent with 
her statements to the AO.149 However, years may pass between filing for 
asylum and the hearing before the IJ,150 and the passage of time works 
against the genuine applicant. As time passes, the asylum seeker contin-
ues to process the traumatic events in her past; through natural memory 
processes, some events recede while others come into sharper focus.151 
The applicant may thus emphasize different aspects of her story at the 
hearing than she did at her AO interview, creating apparent inconsisten-
cies.152 In one study, a group of refugees who had been granted refugee 
status before their arrival in the United Kingdom, and whose histories 
had been verified, were reinterviewed after their arrival.153 The research-
ers found that “up to 65% of the details changed between interviews.”154 
While a memorized fraudulent story is likely to remain consistent,155 a 
genuinely traumatic experience will be told differently over time.156 Any 
inconsistency, however, between the testimony at hearing and the notes 
from the AO interview, which may have occurred years before, can lead 
to impeachment and an adverse credibility finding.157 
                                                            
 148. Martins, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. 
 149. See, e.g., id. 
 150. See, e.g., Settlage, supra note 27, at 100 (noting the asylum process often takes years). 
 151. Eyster, supra note 126, at 37. 
 152. See, e.g., id. 
 153. Id. (citing Jane Herlihy, Peter Scragg & Stuart Turner, Discrepancies in Autobiographical 
Memories—Implications for the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: A Repeated Interviews Study, 324 
BMJ 324–27 (2002)). The same study found that refugees suffering from PTSD had the highest 
levels of inconsistency. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., Schurtman & Lillard, supra note 17, at 59–60 (describing an asylum racket in 
which applicants memorized stock claims). 
 156. Eyster, supra note 126, at 37. 
 157. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2009) (establishing that any inconsistency, inaccuracy, 
or falsehood may be the basis for an adverse credibility finding); see also Malkandi v. Holder, 576 
F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting the REAL ID Act and explaining that the IJ may rely on any 
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In addition, the AO notes and Assessment are at least one—and of-
ten two—steps removed from what the applicant said. The notes record 
the AO’s impression of the applicant’s words, often as relayed through 
an interpreter. Room for error exists both in the interpretation and in the 
note-taking process.158 In addition, an applicant speaking through an in-
terpreter rarely uses the same interpreter at the interview and at the hear-
ing; even if the applicant tells exactly the same story to two different in-
terpreters, style and word choices may cause the resulting accounts in 
English to differ in some details.159 A multilingual applicant may be pro-
vided an interpreter for a language that is not her most fluent.160 In addi-
tion, the AO’s choices of what information to include in the notes and 
what words to use may result in apparent inconsistencies. 
Differences in interpretation may also result in apparent inconsist-
encies. One applicant, for example, testified before the IJ: “They took my 
husband and they put chains on him, and they searched the house, and 
they took some documents from the bedroom.”161 The ICE attorney 
sought to impeach the applicant for inconsistency, relying on the AO’s 
Assessment to Refer, according to which the applicant said: “[The sol-
diers] came into the living room and spoke to my husband . . . . They 
took him to the car and drove him away.”162 The applicant explained that 
she said the same thing both times, she did not see a conflict between the 
two statements, and the different interpreters may have conveyed her 
story differently.163 Although the interpreters were not questioned about 
the discrepancy, the IJ concluded that the applicant’s “inconsistencies 
and overall vagueness” merited an adverse credibility finding.164 
Even inconsistencies that result from misunderstanding a question 
may be grounds for an attack on credibility. One applicant testified at her 
                                                                                                                                     
inconsistency, regardless of whether it goes to the heart of the asylum claim, as a basis for an ad-
verse credibility finding). 
 158. See, e.g., Koulibaly v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 613, 621 (6th Cir. 2008); Sharma v. Holder, 
457 Fed. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2011), amended on denial for reh’g, 249 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 159. See, e.g., Koulibaly, 541 F.3d at 622. 
 160. See Khattak v. Holder, 704 F.3d 197, 200 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013) (declining to make an ad-
verse credibility in the case of a Pakistani applicant, who was most comfortable speaking Urdu but 
had a Pashto interpreter at his AO interview, even though the IJ found the differences between the 
testimony at hearing and the AO notes “somewhat concerning.”). 
 161. Koulibaly, 541 F.3d at 621–22. 
 162. Id. at 622. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 619. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the adverse credibility finding, holding 
that the inconsistent statements were not contradictory. Id. at 622. The court also found that the IJ 
improperly relied on the Assessment to Refer, which lacked detail and did not indicate in what lan-
guage the interview was conducted. Id. 
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hearing that, among other incidents of past harm, Maoists had threatened 
her in 2002.165 The ICE attorney introduced the notes from the AO inter-
view not previously disclosed to the applicant to impeach her.166 The 
notes indicated that in her interview, the applicant said that she suffered a 
physical attack in 2002.167 The applicant explained the discrepancy by 
saying that she was “confused” during the AO interview and had not un-
derstood the question.168 The applicant’s explanation was insufficient to 
counteract the impression of inconsistency; the IJ found her testimony 
not credible and denied her asylum claim.169 On appeal, however, the 
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the AO notes in fact confirmed the appli-
cant’s testimony; along with the applicant’s statement about being at-
tacked, the notes included the AO’s opinion that the applicant had not 
understood the question.170 In that case, evidence corroborating the asy-
lum seeker’s claim was present in the very document used to impeach 
her; however, without access to that document prior to the hearing, the 
asylum seeker did not have the opportunity to identify the information 
and use it to rebut the challenge to her credibility.171 
Detecting and denying fraudulent claims is necessary to preserve 
the integrity of the asylum system; thus, credibility is an issue of prime 
concern.172 However, several aspects of the credibility determination 
serve to heighten the imbalance of immigration proceedings and disad-
vantage genuine applicants without any corresponding increase in detect-
ing fraud. The genuine applicant may not testify in a manner that appears 
convincing and consistent due to cultural norms, natural memory pro-
cesses, and past trauma. These same traits make it difficult for the genu-
ine applicant to justify herself when presented with an apparent incon-
sistency. Withholding immigration documents to impeach tests not 
whether an applicant’s story is true, but how well the applicant responds 
when under pressure and when taken by surprise from an authority fig-
ure. 
                                                            
 165. Sharma v. Holder, 457 Fed. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2011), amended on denial for 
reh’g, 249 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Schurtman & Lillard, supra note 17, at 60 (discussing harm to the system caused 
by fraudulent immigration practitioners). 
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IV. OBTAINING DOCUMENTS VIA FOIA REQUEST: AN INEFFICIENT, 
BURDENSOME, AND UNFAIR PROCESS 
To lessen the imbalance between the applicant and the ICE attorney 
and decrease the risk of being surprised by undisclosed documents at 
hearing, the applicant must file a FOIA request with DHS—the agency 
conducting her prosecution—and request her own immigration rec-
ords.173 She may request her entire A-file, including her asylum applica-
tion, notes from the reasonable fear interview, source material relied up-
on by the AO, the Assessment to Refer, and any other information she 
believes DHS holds.174 The FOIA request is most often met with partial 
disclosure. In fiscal year 2012, USCIS processed 145,278 FOIA re-
quests.175 It granted 16,555 requests in full and granted partial disclosure 
in 86,270 cases.176 The remaining 42,453 requests were denied.177 While 
FOIA is an important tool for government accountability, in the context 
of asylum hearings, FOIA unnecessarily increases the burden on the ap-
plicant and decreases the efficiency of both DHS and the immigration 
courts. 
A. FOIA Disadvantages the Most Vulnerable Applicants 
The most obvious hurdle for pro se applicants is that they may not 
know that FOIA exists or how to use it to get their much-needed docu-
ments. In Dent v. Holder, an immigrant in removal proceedings argued 
that he was a U.S. citizen and could not be removed.178 He asserted that 
his adoptive mother was a U.S. citizen and that she had applied for natu-
ralization on his behalf.179 Although the IJ granted continuances for him 
to try to locate his adoptive mother’s birth certificate—as proof of her 
                                                            
 173. See, e.g., Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that “[f]or asylum seekers and their representatives, a FOIA request for the 
A-File is often the fastest way—and for many, the only practical way—to secure information from 
the A-File that is needed to prepare sufficiently in advance of the merits hearing.”). 
 174. See, e.g., Abramyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 6 F. Supp. 3d 57 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 175. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2012 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT TO THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 4 (2013) [hereinafter DHS 2012 FOIA REPORT], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/foia/privacy-foia-annual-report-fy-2012-dhs.pdf. 
USCIS received 117,787 new FOIA requests in fiscal year 2012 and had 43,568 requests pending at 
the start of the year. Id. at 3. Note that while DHS is composed of eighteen distinct agencies, USCIS 
processed 70% of DHS’s total FOIA requests (145,278 out of 205,895 total). Id. 
 176. Id. at 4. 
 177. Id. Denials were based on several reasons, including: FOIA exemption, no records or 
records already referred, request withdrawn, improper FOIA request, fee-related, request improperly 
described records. Id. 
 178. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 369–70 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 179. Id. 
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citizenship—and his own naturalization application, Dent was unable to 
obtain the documents.180 Without such evidence, the IJ ordered him re-
moved to Honduras.181 Unknown to Dent, among the documents in his 
A-file was the naturalization application filed by his adoptive mother.182 
On his first appeal, Dent “expressly asked for help getting records relat-
ing to his mother’s citizenship etc., because he was in jail and his adop-
tive mother was dead.”183 However, he did not file a FOIA request, and 
DHS did not disclose documents to him.184 On appeal before the Ninth 
Circuit, DHS argued that absent a proper FOIA request, it had no obliga-
tion to disclose documents in its possession.185 
For those applicants who know that FOIA exists, they have the bur-
den of providing a description of the records they want disclosed.186 An 
applicant who submits only a general description may get few or no doc-
uments in return, and her request is not likely to be granted if the appli-
cant is not familiar with the terminology used by DHS to describe herself 
or her records. In Abramyan v. United States Department of Homeland 
Security, an asylum seeker, through her lawyer, filed a FOIA request 
seeking a “complete copy of the Alien File (A-File) (including: all deci-
sion information, all applications, all petitions, all notices, all exhibits, all 
submissions, all receipts, and any and all documents that consist of the 
complete and full Alien file from USCIS).”187 Although the request in-
cluded the applicant’s full name, her date and place of birth, and the 
number of a pending visa, it was denied because it lacked the Alien 
Number, the number assigned by DHS to a noncitizen.188 
Yet applicants who properly request all of their immigration docu-
ments still often receive only partial disclosure. FOIA includes exemp-
tions for nine categories of information that are not subject to disclo-
sure.189 While agencies are not required to disclose information falling 
                                                            
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 370. 
 182. Id. at 374. 
 183. Id. at 372. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 374. The court strongly chastised DHS for withholding the document, vacated the 
removal order, and transferred the case to district court for a determination of whether Dent was a 
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Ninth Circuit. Id. at 369. 
 186. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)(i) (2009). 
 187. Abramyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 6 F. Supp. 3d 57, 59–60 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 188. Id. at 60. The request was later granted in part after an appeal by the applicant’s lawyer. 
Id. 
 189. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(1)–(9) (2009). The exemptions may be summarized as: (1) classified 
national defense information; (2) internal agency rules and practices (personnel); (3) information that 
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within one or more of these categories, the agency must disclose the 
nonprivileged portion if such information is “reasonably segregable” 
from the rest of the privileged document.190 In 2012, USCIS relied on six 
of the nine FOIA exemptions, and in most cases, the exemption required 
only a simple redaction of personal information.191  In Abramyan, for 
example, USCIS relied on exemption (b)(6)—which exempts infor-
mation involving matters of personal privacy—to redact the name of the 
interpreter at the applicant’s asylum interview.192 Other exemptions, 
however, are asserted to withhold broad categories of information. FOIA 
exemption (b)(5) exempts from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency 
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party 
other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”193 USCIS has fre-
quently asserted exemption (b)(5) to withhold both the Assessment to 
Refer and the AO’s interview notes.194 Subsequently, failure to disclose 
the Assessment and AO notes, even after a properly filed FOIA request, 
is frequently raised as an issue on FOIA appeal and on appeal following 
the immigration hearing.195 
B. The FOIA Process Burdens the Agency 
The FOIA process entails a significant burden on the agency. Alt-
hough by law an agency must respond to a FOIA request within twenty 
days,196 USCIS and its predecessor, Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS), have long struggled to meet the statutory time limit.197 In the 
1991 case Mayock v. Nelson, the INS argued that although it had failed 
                                                                                                                                     
is prohibited from disclosure by another federal law; (4) trade secrets and other confidential business 
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 191. DHS 2012 FOIA REPORT, supra note 175, at 6. 
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notes under exemption (b)(5)); Anguimate v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 918 F. Supp. 2d 13, 18 
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 195. See, e.g., Abramyan, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 62 (challenging the withholding of the Assessment 
and the notes under exemption (b)(5)); Anguimate, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (challenging the withhold-
ing of the Assessment); Martins, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (requesting an injunction to compel the 
agency to disclose AO notes). 
 196. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (2009). 
 197. See, e.g., Mayock v. Nelson, 938 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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to timely reply to FOIA requests, the volume of work involved made it 
impossible to comply with the statute given agency resources.198 Follow-
ing the suit, the INS entered into a national settlement agreement under 
which it agreed to immediately process expedited requests where the 
failure to do so would impair due process rights by, for example, not dis-
closing documents until after a removal proceeding.199 Nevertheless, in 
2011, twenty-seven immigration attorneys submitted declarations “attest-
ing to USCIS’s repeated delays of months and in some cases years in 
responding to aliens’ requests for their registration files.”200 The court 
found that not only did the plaintiffs establish that USCIS still had a pat-
tern of delay, “the history of past violations by USCIS and its predeces-
sor agency—going at least as far back as [the plaintiff’s] first lawsuit 
against INS [in 1991]—demonstrates the persistent character of the vio-
lations and supports a finding that the violations are likely to contin-
ue.”201 The court again enjoined the agency to comply with the statute.202 
In response to the injunction and emphasis from the Obama Admin-
istration that agencies improve the timeliness of processing FOIA re-
quests, DHS has increased personnel and expenditures directed to FOIA 
processing and has made progress in reducing its backlog.203 However, 
even with increased resources, delays are common; in 2012, the average 
processing time across all of DHS was seventy-two days,204 far in excess 
of the twenty days mandated by law.205 
In addition to burdening the applicant and the agency, the FOIA 
process increases the burden on immigration courts. The IJ must elicit 
testimony and explore avenues of relief for the applicant while serving as 
an impartial decisionmaker.206 The IJ does not have a duty to issue sub-
poenas for evidence or delay a hearing for an applicant to seek infor-
mation held by government agencies.207 While under pressure to deal 
                                                            
 198. Id. at 1007–08. 
 199. Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 
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efficiently with an enormous caseload,208 the IJ must frequently decide 
whether to instruct an applicant about FOIA and whether to continue a 
hearing while an applicant waits for and possibly challenges FOIA re-
sponses. 
C. Policy and Case Law Support Greater and More Efficient Disclosure 
Apart from the burdens on the parties mentioned above, administra-
tive policy, case law, and common sense all support a shift to greater dis-
closure of immigration documents. On January 21, 2009, President 
Obama issued a FOIA Memorandum calling for a “presumption of dis-
closure” and a “spirit of cooperation” in disclosing information.209 The 
Attorney General followed up by issuing FOIA Guidelines on March 19, 
2009.210 The Guidelines call on agencies to reexamine their FOIA prac-
tices in light of a “fundamental commitment to open government.”211 The 
Guidelines make clear that “an agency should not withhold information 
simply because it may do so legally.”212 The Attorney General “strongly 
encourage[s] agencies to make discretionary disclosures of information,” 
to disclose information proactively, and to improve efficiency in admin-
istering FOIA requests.213  
The Guidelines also announced a shift in Department of Justice pol-
icy.214 Previously, the Department of Justice defended all agency denials 
of FOIA requests that “had a sound legal basis.”215 Under the new policy, 
the Department of Justice defends only those denials where “the agency 
reasonably foresees” that disclosure would do real harm to one of the 
interests protected by the statutory exemptions.216 In other words, it is no 
longer enough that information may fall into an exempted category; ra-
ther, to deny a FOIA request, the agency must have a legitimate reason to 
believe that the disclosure would cause harm.217 As the Attorney General 
summarized, “bureaucratic hurdles have no place” in a transparent gov-
ernment.218 
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Additionally, case law is increasingly calling for greater disclosure. 
While agency withholding of AO notes, Assessments to Refer, and other 
documents in the A-file has been widely practiced, several recent deci-
sions have either required disclosure or called into question the use of 
such documents, when not previously disclosed, to impeach. The practice 
of withholding AO notes under FOIA exemption (b)(5) was successfully 
challenged in Martins v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Ser-
vices.219 In Martins, the court noted that while DHS once commonly dis-
closed AO notes in response to a FOIA request, recent practice has been 
for the agency to withhold the notes220 under FOIA exemption (b)(5).221 
At the same time, ICE trial attorneys have increasingly relied upon the 
notes to impeach at hearing.222 The court gave DHS two weeks to pro-
vide a detailed explanation of why the notes fall within the claimed ex-
emption, and held that “if the notes are similar to the examples in the 
record . . . it is the court’s holding that the notes are not subject to the 
deliberative process privilege, and the court does not expect them . . . to 
be withheld on that ground.”223 In response, in November 2013, USCIS 
entered into a settlement in which it agreed that AO notes did not fall 
under the deliberative process exemption.224 USCIS agreed to instruct 
“officers, employees, and agents involved in the processing of FOIA re-
quests” that records reflecting information obtained at asylum interviews 
“shall be produced.”225 While USCIS retains the right to withhold the 
notes based on other exemptions, the settlement precludes “the withhold-
ing of such documents on the basis that asylum interview notes are ge-
nerically protected . . . by virtue of their status as asylum interview 
notes.”226 
Similarly, in 2005 the Ninth Circuit called into question the use of 
Assessments to Refer and other documents from the asylum interview to 
impeach the applicant’s credibility.227 In Singh v. Gonzalez, the IJ found 
the applicant not credible, based in part on inconsistencies between his 
                                                            
 219. Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 
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testimony at hearing and his statements to the AO as recorded in the As-
sessment to Refer.228 The B.I.A. affirmed.229 However, on appeal before 
the Ninth Circuit, the court found that the asylum interview is a “poten-
tially unreliable point of comparison . . . for purposes of a credibility de-
termination.”230 Although the IJ compared Singh’s testimony with his 
statements in the Assessment to Refer, there was “no indication from the 
record that Singh received a copy of the Assessment to Refer . . . at any 
time before the IJ issued her decision.”231 The Ninth Circuit identified 
numerous problems with relying on the Assessment to Refer to impeach: 
the Assessment did not indicate the language in which the interview was 
conducted;232 Singh was “not asked about whether the asylum officer’s 
report of the interview was accurate,” either at the time of the interview 
or at the hearing;233 and the AO did not testify to confirm the contents of 
his notes or reports.234 Finally, the court noted that the 1995 amendments 
to asylum procedures reduced the authority of the AO, and arguably re-
duced the expectation that the AO keep accurate and reliable records of 
the asylum interview: 
The amendment of the regulations effectively removed the two 
principal functions—preparing a written assessment of the claim 
and rendering a written decision—that would require, or at least 
provide an impetus for, in the majority of asylum interviews, an 
asylum officer to keep an accurate and reliable record of the appli-
cant’s statements during the interview.235 
The court found that the Assessment to Refer lacked sufficient indicia of 
reliability to support the adverse credibility finding and remanded for 
further proceedings, accepting Singh’s testimony as credible.236 
The 2009 case Cinapian v. Holder focused on the fundamental un-
fairness of using undisclosed and unverified documents to impeach.237 In 
Cinapian, an Iranian national applied for asylum based on targeted per-
secution of Christians in her home country.238 She filed various support-
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ing documents with her asylum application, including her birth certificate 
and a Christianity Certificate prepared by a church in Iran.239 Her claim 
was referred to immigration court.240 At the hearing, DHS—represented 
by an ICE attorney—introduced a previously undisclosed forensic report 
that cast doubt on the authenticity of the birth certificate and the Christi-
anity Certificate.241 Although the IJ informed DHS that it should have 
disclosed the forensic report, she refused to grant a continuance and 
found the applicant not credible.242  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that relying on the forensic report 
to undermine credibility was fundamentally unfair.243 Even assuming that 
the forensic report had been prepared properly and without bias, “a varie-
ty of possible innocuous explanations for a document’s apparent lack of 
authenticity may exist.”244 Had the applicant known that the authenticity 
of the documents was in doubt, she could have obtained further corrobo-
rating evidence; similarly, had the forensic examiner testified, the appli-
cant could have cross-examined her regarding her degree of certainty and 
the number of times she had examined similar documents from Iran.245 
The court held that “the combination of the government’s failure to dis-
close the DHS forensic reports in advance of the hearing or to make the 
reports’ author available for cross-examination . . . denied [the applicant] 
a fair hearing.”246 
In the Dent case, described above, the Ninth Circuit held that in re-
moval proceedings, the applicant has “mandatory access” to his A-file.247 
The court stated that “Congress has provided that to meet his burden of 
proof in removal proceedings, ‘the alien shall have access’ to his entry 
document ‘and any other records and documents, not considered by the 
Attorney General to be confidential, pertaining to the alien’s admission 
or presence in the United States.’”248 Rejecting DHS’s argument that ab-
sent a FOIA request it had no obligation to disclose records, the court 
held that “this mandatory access law entitled Dent to his A-file” regard-
less of whether he had filed a FOIA request.249 Despite the court’s clear 
language, DHS has construed Dent to apply only in the Ninth Circuit and 
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only to cases in which a person raises a citizenship claim.250 However, 
there is good reason to apply the holding in Dent to all asylum hearings. 
V. TOWARDS GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN ASYLUM PROCEEDINGS 
Simpler, faster, and fuller disclosure of records in affirmative asy-
lum adjudications would improve the fairness and transparency of the 
proceedings, increase the reliability of credibility determinations, en-
courage efficiency, and reduce costs. Unlike substantive immigration 
reforms that require congressional action, procedural changes to disclo-
sure are not only within the discretion of USCIS, they are necessary to 
bring agency policy into harmony with the guidelines established by the 
Obama Administration, the policy established by DHS, and the trend of 
case law. USCIS should proactively disclose to the applicant much if not 
all of the information in the A-file, including research materials relied 
upon by the AO, the AO notes, and the Assessment to Refer. This disclo-
sure would require USCIS to apply a presumption of openness to the 
contents of the A-file and to empower the AO to make an initial review 
of the A-file for sensitive information. 
A. Proactive Disclosure to Asylum Applicants 
The asylum seeker referred to immigration court has a certain need 
for her immigration records held by USCIS. In harmony with policy 
guidelines calling for transparency251 and case law mandating disclo-
sure,252 the applicant should not have to request documents that she 
needs, that must be disclosed to her, and that are within the agency’s 
possession. Rather, copies of these documents should be delivered to her 
at the same time as the Notice to Appear. The current system requires a 
FOIA request even for documents that are necessary to the applicant and 
that do not fall within a FOIA exception. This disadvantages applicants 
who are unaware of the FOIA process253 and adds unnecessary costs and 
delay to both the applicant and the agency. A presumption of proactive 
disclosure should exist regarding research materials relied upon by the 
AO, AO interview notes, and the Assessment to Refer. 
                                                            
 250. Heeren, supra note 31, at 1587. 
 251. Holder Memo, supra note 35. 
 252. See e.g., Dent, 627 F.3d at 374. 
 253. See, e.g., id. at 373–74; Abramyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 6 F. Supp. 3d 57, 60 
(D.D.C. 2013) (describing DHS withholding of documents when request did not include Alien 
Number). 
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1. Research Materials Should Be Proactively Disclosed 
Research materials, including Department of State country reports, 
reports from human rights organizations, and other third-party sources, 
are valuable “extrinsic evidence” that provide context and serve as a 
plausibility check on the applicant’s story.254 The AO is encouraged to 
access such research and may rely on inconsistency between the appli-
cant’s story and extrinsic evidence as a reason for referring the claim to 
immigration court.255 Until 1997, applicants had a statutory right to ex-
amine and respond to materials relied upon by the AO; under current 
law, however, the AO is not required to provide, cite, or even name 
source materials.256 While the Assessment to Refer often includes cita-
tions to common source material, such as a Department of State country 
report, at times citations are either lacking entirely or are too obscure to 
enable access to the cited source.257 
Disclosing the resources relied upon is necessary for the fair and 
accurate determination of asylum claims. As the Third Circuit noted, “in 
the troubled areas of the planet from which asylum claims tend to come, 
the pace of change is rapid—oppressive regimes rise and fall, and condi-
tions improve and worsen . . . .”258 Source materials may be inaccurate, 
incomplete, or outdated.259 Requiring that reliable citations to source ma-
terials be included in the Assessment to Refer would aid both the ICE 
attorney and the applicant. While ICE attorneys have frequently offered 
the Assessment to Refer as impeachment evidence, courts have become 
increasingly skeptical of accepting unsupported assertions contained in 
Assessments. In Singh, the court emphasized that evidence presented 
against an applicant requires substantial “indicia of credibility”; the sim-
ple assertion of an AO is not enough.260 Inconsistencies between the ap-
                                                            
 254. See, e.g., Lialko v. Ashcroft, 111 F. App’x 134, 135 (3d Cir. 2004); AFFIRMATIVE 
ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21−22. 
 255. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 83, at 21−22. 
 256. See Proposed Rules: Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum 
or Withholding of Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 14779, 14789 
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 257. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hemed v. U.S. Dep’t of Home-
land Sec., No. 1:2013cv00129 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2013),, available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/ 
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 258. Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 
F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 259. See, e.g., id. (noting that the B.I.A. relied on a country report that was four years old). 
 260. Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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plicant’s story and reported country conditions should be demonstrated 
by offering the source material as evidence, not through secondhand as-
sertions. 
It is not enough, however, to cite research materials in an Assess-
ment that is then withheld from the applicant. Without access to the 
sources relied upon, the applicant has no opportunity to rebut inaccurate 
or outdated evidence.261  For research materials to be meaningful aids in 
determining the truth of an asylum claim, both sides must have oppor-
tunity to examine and rebut the research relied upon. The sources relied 
upon by the AO should be disclosed to the applicant along with the refer-
ral notice. 
2. AO Notes Should Be Proactively Disclosed 
AO notes should also be proactively disclosed. Per USCIS policy, 
AO notes are an “accurate” and “objective” record of the applicant’s asy-
lum interview.262 The notes do not contain opinions or inferences from 
the AO,263 and cannot properly be considered “part of the deliberative 
process.”264 In most cases, the notes are the only record of the inter-
view.265 The notes are frequently relied upon as evidence of the contents 
of the applicant’s statement and her demeanor during her AO inter-
view.266 In most cases, however, the applicant never reviews those 
notes.267 The notes may contain errors or misunderstandings that the ap-
plicant is powerless to rebut unless she has access to the notes. 
The current process of requiring the applicant to file a FOIA re-
quest to obtain the interview notes is particularly unnecessary in light of 
the Martins settlement, which established that AO interview notes will 
no longer be withheld under the deliberative process exemption.268  
Withholding AO notes until a FOIA request is properly filed creates un-
necessary expense for the agency, unnecessary delay for the applicant, 
                                                            
 261. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 7, at 378 (petitioning the B.I.A. to reexamine the IJ’s ad-
verse credibility finding because the applicant produced, after her hearing, expert evidence to rebut 
the assertion that her claim was implausible). The denial of asylum was later overturned. See In re 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358–59 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 262. AOBTC INTERVIEWING PART 2, supra note 86, at 5–6. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Abramyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 6 F. Supp. 3d 57, 61 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 265. See, e.g., Sharma v. Holder, 457 Fed. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2011), amended on denial 
for reh’g, 249 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 266. See, e.g., Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113 
(N.D. Cal. 2013); Sharma, 457 Fed. App’x at 616. 
 267. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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LB (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.courthousenews.com/2013/11/21/immsett.pdf. 
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and disadvantages applicants who are unaware of FOIA. Conversely, 
disclosing the notes from the AO interview to the applicant with the re-
ferral notice would increase fairness, transparency, and efficiency. 
3. The Assessment to Refer Should Be Proactively Disclosed 
Assessments to Refer are generally withheld under FOIA exemp-
tion (b)(5), which protects communications originating within a govern-
ment agency that are “pre-decisional” and “part of the deliberative pro-
cess.”269 While there is no question that the government can demonstrate, 
“as a technical matter,”270 that Assessments fall within the inter-agency 
FOIA exemption,271 disclosure of the Assessment to Refer would lead to 
a more fair and efficient process without impeding the government’s 
ability to detect and deny fraudulent asylum claims. Under FOIA Guide-
lines, information should not be withheld merely because it could legally 
fit within an exemption, but rather should only be withheld if the agency 
“reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm” a protected interest.272 
Accordingly, in 2012 DHS instituted a requirement that when recom-
mending that information be withheld, program offices provide a “harm 
analysis” detailing the harm that could result from disclosure.273 Thus, 
Assessments to Refer should not be withheld unless the agency reasona-
bly foresees—and details in an analysis—the harm that could result from 
disclosure. USCIS has not and cannot meet this burden. 
The Assessment to Refer serves the same purpose and contains the 
same information as the NOID. 274 The only difference between the two 
documents is the status of the applicant.275 If the applicant has a current 
visa, the AO issues the NOID directly to her.276 If the applicant does not 
have a current visa, the AO issues the Assessment to Refer to ICE, who 
assigns a trial attorney to argue for removal.277 
                                                            
 269. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2009). See, e.g., Anguimate v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 918 F. 
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Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2001) (explaining the limits of exemption 
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 272. Holder Memo, supra note 35. 
 273. DHS 2013 CHIEF FOIA OFFICER REPORT, supra note 35, at 10. 
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 275. AOBTC WRITING PART 1, supra note 96, at 6–7. 
 276. Id. at 7. 
 277. Id. at 5, 7. 
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Thus, the same information contained in the Assessment to Refer is 
routinely and proactively disclosed to the in-status applicant in the 
NOID. Far from harming a protected interest, disclosing the NOID to the 
asylum applicant results in a fairer and more accurate determination of 
credibility. According to a USCIS memorandum, “the NOID is de-
signed . . . so that the filer can understand why the evidence submitted 
has not been persuasive and can have the best chance to overcome the 
deficiency if possible.”278 After receiving the NOID, the in-status appli-
cant has sixteen days to respond.279 She may submit explanations of her 
own testimony, research materials that support her claim, or affidavits 
from experts or other witnesses.280 USCIS has never argued that disclos-
ing the NOID and allowing the applicant the opportunity to respond hin-
ders the government’s ability to make an accurate determination of cred-
ibility, nor is there any evidence to support the assertion. 
Under both administrative guidelines and DHS policy, USCIS may 
only withhold the Assessment to Refer if the agency reasonably foresees 
that disclosure will harm a protected interest and can describe that harm 
in detail.281 However, the same information is routinely disclosed to in-
status applicants without harm.282 USCIS cannot justify the blanket with-
holding of Assessments to Refer except by recourse to legal technicali-
ties, relying on exactly the kind of “bureaucratic hurdles” that have no 
place in an open government.283 
The Assessment to Refer should be disclosed to the applicant with-
out need for a FOIA request in the same way that the NOID is disclosed 
to the in-status applicant. Such proactive disclosure would pose no risk to 
a protected interest, but would increase the fairness, transparency, and 
efficiency of asylum proceedings. 
B. A Presumption of Disclosure 
While most proposals for immigration reform are predicated on 
new legislation or radical changes to existing procedures, proactive dis-
closure of routine documents requires only a shift in agency approach. 
Under the current presumption of nondisclosure, records in an immi-
grant’s A-file are presumed to be off-limits and are only disclosed, if at 
                                                            
 278. Interoffice Memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director of Operations, 
USCIS (Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_ 
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 283. Holder Memo, supra note 35. 
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all, after a lengthy and bureaucratic request process. This presumption of 
nondisclosure, however, is counterproductive in at least three ways: it 
decreases the integrity of the hearing, increases the cost to the agency, 
and undermines trust in the immigration system. 
1. Nondisclosure Does Not Lead to More Accurate Hearings 
The practice of nondisclosure hinders the IJ’s decisionmaking and 
invites error. Credibility is notoriously difficult to judge.284 A full and 
fair credibility determination is based on “substantial evidence” from 
both parties, not on “speculation” and “conjecture.”285 The current reli-
ance on nondisclosure may make it easier for the ICE attorney to im-
peach an applicant, but there is no evidence that it leads to more accurate 
credibility determinations; instead, the practice arguably disadvantages 
genuine applicants.286 
In addition, the practice of nondisclosure encourages ICE to take 
legal shortcuts by relying on unsupported statements and 
nonauthenticated documents.287 For example, relying on the AO’s notes 
or assertions in the Assessment to Refer without calling the AO to testi-
fy, without corroborating the AO’s assertions, and without allowing the 
applicant to prepare a rebuttal is a legal shortcut that would not be toler-
ated in criminal court.288 Such shortcuts may quickly undermine an ap-
plicant’s credibility, but “shortcuts frequently turn out to be mistakes.”289 
The courts “should not encourage the cutting of corners by an agency 
having such significant responsibilities.”290 
                                                            
 284. Eyster, supra note 126, at 8 (noting that even experts have little more than a 50% success 
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 285. Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 
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 286. See supra Part III.B. 
 287. See, e.g., Martins v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1106 
(N.D. Cal. 2013); Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 288. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005); FED. R. EVID. 801–802 
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2. Nondisclosure Is Expensive 
Not only does nondisclosure inhibit the agency from detecting 
fraud, it unnecessarily increases agency costs and undermines trust in the 
immigration system. The presumption of nondisclosure increases agency 
costs because it routes all documents in the A-file through the FOIA ad-
ministrator, even the most innocuous documents likely to be disclosed if 
requested. While some information may need a full review by a FOIA 
administrator, many routine documents do not pose a “reasonably fore-
seeable” risk of harm and could be disclosed without a full FOIA review. 
A presumption of openness would allow for many documents to be pro-
actively disclosed, taking them out of the FOIA backlog entirely and sav-
ing agency resources. 
Nondisclosure also increases costs and decreases efficiency by 
opening the door to appeal. Although impeaching through undisclosed 
documents is a longstanding practice, case law has increasingly held that 
the documents used to impeach may not themselves be reliable and may 
need corroborating evidence, such as testimony by the author, if relied 
upon to attack credibility.291 In Singh, Cinapian, Koulibaly, and many 
other cases, nondisclosure led to a lengthy and expensive journey 
through the administrative system and the courts of appeal.292 
Nondisclosure is also costly because it undermines confidence in 
the immigration system. By increasing opacity and heightening the im-
balance between the parties, nondisclosure fosters distrust of the legal 
system.293 The asylum seeker already has the burden of proving that she 
meets the definition of a refugee and merits a discretionary grant of asy-
lum. The presumption of nondisclosure creates the additional burden of 
guessing what information the government may have, requesting it 
properly, and preparing to rebut documents she has never seen.294 The 
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manifest injustice and imbalance of a system where the government does 
not “fight fair” creates an incentive to circumvent that system.295 
3. Openness Should Be the Presumption 
The Attorney General has urged agencies to adopt a presumption of 
openness, making “discretionary” and “proactive” disclosures even when 
not required to do so by law.296 The current presumption of nondisclosure 
leads to a reflexive withholding of information that, as described above, 
is both ineffective and inefficient. 
In contrast, a presumption of openness would result in a different 
attitude toward the information stored in the A-file. While the A-file may 
contain documents that are genuinely sensitive, in most cases, it contains 
routine records. A presumption of openness would lead USCIS staff to 
examine the A-file not with a view to how much can be withheld but 
with the expectation that most, if not all, of the information will be dis-
closed. In turn, an expectation of proactive disclosure would bypass the 
need for a FOIA request for many routine documents. As the court held 
in Dent, the noncitizen in a removal proceeding should have “mandatory 
access” to her A-file, whether she files a FOIA request or not:297 “The 
only practical way to give an alien access [to his A-file] is to furnish him 
with a copy . . . . We are unable to imagine a good reason for not produc-
ing the A-file routinely without a request . . . .”298 
C. The AO as the First Decisionmaker 
Finally, in order to make proactive disclosure practical, USCIS 
must empower the AO to be the first decisionmaker. Presuming that the 
A-file will be disclosed and that not all information requires a full FOIA 
review before disclosure, the first decisions about the sensitivity of in-
formation should be made by the person most familiar with that infor-
mation: the AO. 
Agencies generate vast quantities of records. A FOIA request can-
not reasonably be foreseen for the majority of these records; thus, records 
are archived to be accessible if requested. FOIA administrators have the 
job of receiving FOIA requests, searching for the requested information, 
and responding to the request with full disclosure, partial disclosure, or a 
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 297. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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1106 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1069 
denial.299 However, in the context of asylum referrals, this procedure is 
redundant and inefficient. Unlike most agency records, the A-file is al-
most sure to be requested by an asylum applicant who is referred to im-
migration court; decisions about disclosure could thus be made before 
the file is ever stored. 
The AO knows the A-file thoroughly; she researches the infor-
mation in the A-file before interviewing the applicant. The AO takes the 
interview notes and writes the Assessment to Refer. The AO also deals 
with multiple asylum applications and sees multiple A-files; she is in the 
best position to notice if a file contains unusual and sensitive infor-
mation. Rather than a FOIA administrator who sees a file for the first 
time when it is requested, the AO is the logical person to make an initial 
determination if information must be redacted or withheld. An initial 
FOIA review by the AO would empower the AO to determine which 
documents can be disclosed as is, redact those documents that contain 
sensitive information that is easily segregable, and flag those documents 
that require a more thorough review by a FOIA administrator. 
Working cooperatively with non-FOIA staff in order to improve ef-
ficiency is specifically encouraged in the FOIA Guidelines,300 and sever-
al agencies have already begun to integrate non-FOIA staff into their 
processing systems.301 To effectively implement a preliminary review by 
the AO, the agency would have to provide training and decrease AO 
caseloads;302 such adjustments in workload would allow AOs to handle 
fewer cases more thoroughly while at the same time significantly in-
creasing the efficiency and decreasing the cost of FOIA administration. 
The AO, who makes the initial decision concerning the applicant’s 
eligibility, should also make the initial decision regarding disclosure. The 
AO should be empowered to give the applicant not only a Notice to Ap-
pear in immigration court, but also the documents necessary to prepare 
for that hearing. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Domestic and international law recognize the extreme vulnerability 
of people who are targets of persecution in their home countries due to 
their race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or social group. To pro-
vide a measure of refuge, asylum law prohibits returning such vulnerable 
individuals to countries where their life or freedom is threatened. 
The number of affirmative asylum cases is relatively small, but the 
stakes are high for all parties; for the applicant, asylum may be the dif-
ference between life and death. The government is bound by law and 
treaty not to return refugees to countries in which they face a well-
founded fear of threat to life or freedom, but it must also detect the false 
claims that accompany the genuine. AOs and IJs seek to make fair and 
just determinations while working within time and resource constraints. 
The current procedure for disclosure of information in affirmative 
asylum cases is not only unnecessarily burdensome, it leads to inaccurate 
determinations of credibility and decreases efficiency in USCIS and im-
migration court. A presumption of disclosure in asylum hearings is not a 
substitute for comprehensive immigration reform, but it is a possible and 
pragmatic step that would increase both fairness and efficiency. 
